Well in the realm of the common law, classic cases (which Krell v. Henry is) do matter as they laid down the foundation of the substantial body of law that the U.S. legal system has adopted. Even the recent SC opinion of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Institution cited 13th Century English common law in its analysis. You'll be surprised by how many English cases you'll read if you go to law school.
A recent example of Krell v. Henry being cited:
Defendant's last remaining defense—frustration of purpose—is a creature of the common law. Unlike commercial impracticability, which looks to the effect of unforeseen contingencies on the burden of performing a contract obligation, the frustration of purpose doctrine looks to the effect of such contingencies on the parties' reasons for entering into an agreement in the first place. Where an unforeseen contingency substantially frustrates the "'principal purpose of [*19] [a] party'" in entering into a contract, it may justify non-performance by that party. Convenience Store Leasing and Mgmt. v. Annapurna Marketing, 2019 WI App 40, ¶ 16, 388 Wis. 2d 353, 363, 933 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
The doctrine is best illustrated with an example. In Krell v. Henry, "[o]ne of the earliest cases of frustration of purpose," Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nw. Transp. Co., 82 Wis. 2d 514, 522, 263 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. 197
, the defendant leased an apartment with a window overlooking the route of King Edward VII's coronation parade. [1903] 2 K.B. 740, 740-41 (AC). The lease agreement was consummated through the exchange of two letters, neither of which "mention[ed] the coronation." Id. at 741. Indeed, the letters "sp[oke] merely of" defendant's agreement to lease—at the price of 75 pounds—plaintiff's apartment during "the daytime" hours of June 26 and June 27, 1902. Id. at 749. After the contract was executed, the King took ill, and the coronation parade was cancelled. Id. at 740. Because defendant no longer had any reason for using the apartment, he refused to honor the lease. The tenant sued and the trial judge found for the defendant. Id. at 740, 742.
In affirming that decision, the Court of Appeal found that the defendant's facially unambiguous agreement to lease the apartment was qualified by an implied understanding that the defendant's sole purpose in leasing the apartment was to watch the coronation parade. Id. at 751-52. It reasoned that it was not "in the contemplation [*20] of the contracting parties, when the contract was made, that the coronation would not be held on the proclaimed days," and, consequently, held that the express "words imposing on the defendant the obligation to accept and pay for the use of the rooms for the named days, although general and unconditional, were not used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency which afterwards occurred." Id. at 750. The defendant's duty to perform his end of the bargain was, accordingly, discharged.
Since Krell, the frustration of purpose doctrine has become firmly rooted in American common law tradition. In 1978, the Wisconsin Supreme Court formally adopted the doctrine, as articulated by a tentative draft of Section 265 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Wm. Beaudoin & Sons, Inc. v. Milwaukee Cty., 63 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 217 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Wis. 1974); see also Pacific Railroad, 82 Wis. 2d at 521-22, 263 N.W. 2d at 193. That draft provided that
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
Romans v. Orange Pelican, LLC, No. 22 CV 4169, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64935, at *18-20 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2023)
Updated On: 1/4/24 at 04:00 PM
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